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Abstract 
There is an intensive dispute in political economics about the impact of institutions on income 
redistribution. While the main focus is on comparison between different forms of representa-
tive democracy, the influence of direct democracy on redistribution has attracted much less 
attention. In this paper, employing both a composite index and measures of single institutions, 
we find that direct democracy is particularly associated with lower welfare spending. More-
over, we estimate a model which explains the determinants of achieved redistribution meas-
ured by Gini coefficients using panel data provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Office from 
1981 to 1997. While our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income 
and actual redistribution is lower, inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in 
representative democracies for a given initial income distribution.  
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1  Introduction 
In recent political economy analyses, the impact of constitutional differences on income redis-
tribution has been discussed intensively. Most prominently, PERSSON and TABELLINI (2000) 
compare majoritarian systems with systems of proportional representation as well as presiden-
tial with parliamentarian systems to find out whether they differently affect income redistribu-
tion. They argue that majoritarian elections lead to more targeted spending (local public con-
sumption) due to pork barrel politics, less non-targeted spending (broad social spending like 
unemployment insurance) and a larger size of government (higher taxes) than proportional 
elections. For a panel of OECD countries since the 1960’s, MILESI-FERRETI, PEROTTI and RO-
STAGNO (2002) find that transfer payments are indeed strongly positively related to the degree 
of proportional representation. PERSSON and TABELLINI (1999, 2003) support these findings 
and also report evidence that welfare spending is lower in presidential systems. 
The comparative impact of direct and representative democracy on income redistribution has 
however not been analyzed yet. This holds despite the fact that discussions about direct de-
mocracy are often accompanied by hopes and fears as to its influence on fiscal and social 
policies. For example, when the Progressive Movement succeeded to introduce citizen initia-
tives in the first state constitutions at the turn to the 20
th century, opponents argued that this 
institutional change would lead to socialism. CRONIN (1989, p. 52), e.g., quotes the Los Ange-
les Times asserting that “radical legislation would result, and business and property rights 
would be subject to constant turmoil at the hands of the agitators”. This perception was influ-
enced by an existing relationship between the proponents of the initiative and leftist factions 
(CRONIN, 1989, p. 50). Similarly, the discussions about the introduction of direct democracy 
in Germany have been mainly originating from left-wing social movements (see the assess-
ment by NEUMANN 1999, pp. 17). However, the restrictions which direct democratic decisions 
about financial issues face according to German constitutional law also stem from the fear 
that selfish  voting  behavior in  referendums  on tax laws would  endanger general  interests 
(SIEKMANN, 1999, p. 183), i.e. pose problems for governments’ aims to redistribute income.  
Theoretically, the impact of direct democracy on income redistribution is also contested. Al-
though it could be argued on the basis of MELTZER and RICHARD (1981) that the median voter 
would redistribute more income than could be accomplished in legislative decisions, this re-
sult depends on strong  assumptions which  do not  necessarily hold (BOADWAY and  KEEN 
2000). In this paper, a first attempt is thus made to provide systematic empirical evidence on  
the impact of direct democracy on income redistribution. There already exists an extensive 
literature on the economic effects of referendums and initiatives (see MATSUSAKA 2004, FELD 
and KIRCHGÄSSNER 2006 for surveys), which has mainly focused on public expenditure, reve-
nue and debt and found that these are substantially lowered by referendums or initiatives. This 
particularly holds for the U.S. states (and local jurisdictions) for which MATSUSAKA (2004) 
provides the most convincing evidence as well as for Swiss cantons (states) and local jurisdic-
tions for which comparable evidence is provided by FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (1999, 2001, 
2001a)  and  by  FELD  and  MATSUSAKA  (2003).  With  respect  to  the components  of  public 
spending, SCHALTEGGER (2001) as well as VATTER and FREITAG (2002) find that mainly can-
tonal and local welfare, culture, police and educational spending, and cantonal administrative 
spending are reduced by direct democracy. FELD and MATSUSAKA (2003a) report that cantons 
with stronger direct democratic institutions on fiscal issues rely more strongly on user charges 
than on broad-based taxes to finance spending (see also MATSUSAKA 1995 for the U.S.).  
These empirical findings suggest that direct democratic institutions reduce income inequality 
to a lesser extent through the public sector because less public funds are available and allo-
cated for redistributive purposes. However, reducing the size of these funds does not neces-
sarily lead to a decrease in distributive gaps between the affluent and the needy if redistribu-
tion programs are better targeted in direct than in representative democratic systems. In this 
study, we thus first analyze the impact of direct democracy on welfare and non-welfare spend-
ing in order to provide a more differentiated analysis on public spending components than in 
previous studies.
1) In particular, we have a closer look at both, the cantonal and local spending 
structure as well as the cantonal spending structure. Moreover, we consider different instru-
ments of direct democracy explicitly. In a second step, we estimate a model to explain the 
effect of direct democracy on income redistribution as measured by Gini coefficients using 
panel data from the Swiss Federal Tax Office to assess to what extent income redistribution is 
effectively affected in a direct democracy. After a brief review of political economy models of 
income redistribution in Section 2, the Swiss institutions of direct democracy are introduced 
in Section 3. In Section 4, the impact of direct democracy on welfare and non-welfare spend-
ing is econometrically analyzed. The estimation results of the impact of direct democracy on 
income redistribution are presented in Section 5. Conclusions follow in Section 6. 
                                                            
1.  Because total cantonal and local as well as cantonal spending have been extensively studied, often using the 
same sample, we refer the reader to these papers (see FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER 2006 for a survey).   
2  Political Economy Models of Income Redistribution 
Models describing the determinants of income redistribution in a democracy have in common 
that they mainly built upon the median voter theorem. According to MELTZER and RICHARD 
(1981), income redistribution through  taxes and transfers is the higher in a median voter 
model the more skewed the income distribution is.
2) Skewness of the income distribution 
could be measured by the ratio of mean to median income which provides a good intuition for 
the political mechanism underlying redistribution: The higher the mean as compared to me-
dian income the more the median income taxpayer (supposed to be identical with the median 
voter) can gain from taxing the rich.
3) The direction in which income is redistributed, and the 
resulting net income distribution are, however, not fully determined. The median voter might 
form a coalition with the poor in order to exploit the rich, or engage in a coalition with the 
rich in order to exploit the poor such that income redistribution occurs toward the median in-
come position, a finding that is called Director’s Law (STIGLER 1970). The rich might, how-
ever, also form a coalition with the poor against the middle income class which has the advan-
tage for the rich of acquiring votes most cheaply and for the poor of getting higher transfers 
than in a coalition with the middle income class. Given the possibility of these different coali-
tions, no clear-cut predictions on voting outcomes over income redistribution can be made 
(BOADWAY and KEEN 2000, HARMS and ZINK 2003).  
Since most countries in the world are not constituted as pure direct democracies – even U.S. 
states or Swiss cantons are representative democracies – the political economy analysis of in-
come redistribution in representative democracies is more relevant than the median voter mo-
dels summarized before. In a citizen candidate model, BESLEY and COATE (1997) argue that 
candidates can follow their own interests between elections even though there is an attach-
ment to citizens’ preferences through the political/candidate selection process. Aside other 
personal motives of office holders, such interests may stem from ideological dispositions (DI-
XIT and LONDREGAN 1998, ROEMER 1998) such that left wing party members impose higher 
marginal tax rates in progressive income tax schedules than right wing party followers. Sec-
ond,  representatives  follow  the  interests  of  their  constituencies  (WEINGAST,  SHEPSLE  and 
JOHNSEN 1981), as they are eager to obtain benefits geographically concentrated in their elec-
                                                            
2.  Skewness of the income distribution is however not synonymous to income inequality. See LEE and ROEMER 
(1998) and BOADWAY and KEEN (2000). For example, two near symmetric income distributions having the 
same mean but different variances may have the same skewness (close to zero). The less dispersed income 
distribution could easily be more equal than the other. 
3.  For empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis see BORGE and RATTSØ (2004).  
toral district while spreading the costs over the whole population. Logrolling among represen-
tatives in parliaments (under a rule of universalism) ensures that such pork barrel politics re-
mains stable and income redistribution occurs from the districts of the losing coalition to tho-
se of the winning coalition. Third, representatives can be captured by special interest groups 
that engage in rent seeking activities.
4) Rent seeking as such involves redistributing income 
from those groups in society which are not successfully lobbying the government to those 
which are. Fourth, bureaucrats may be able to induce deviations of policy outcomes from me-
dian voter preferences (NISKANEN 1971, ROMER and ROSENTHAL 1978, 1979), because they 
have an information advantage (compared to voters and politicians) as to the real costs of 
public projects. These considerations suggest that, from a societal point of view, income re-
distribution in representative democracies is inefficient as actual redistribution deviates from 
the preferred level, and, also, as those groups might benefit which are not the neediest ones.   
A general argument could thus be made as to different policy outcomes in systems with and 
without instruments of direct democracy as far as the latter can be supposed to correct policies 
towards median voter preferences. Referendums and initiatives provide instruments to selec-
tively control  representatives and override  their decisions (ROMER  and ROSENTHAL 1978, 
1979, FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER 2001). Under complete information, representatives (and bu-
reaucrats) have reduced possibilities to follow their selfish or ideological goals, or to favor 
their constituencies or special interest groups. Assuming asymmetric information, such an 
outcome may not necessarily obtain (GERBER and LUPIA 1995, MATSUSAKA and MCCARTY 
2001). Influential interest groups can threaten representatives to start an initiative process in 
order to challenge a political decision to be taken in the legislature. If interest groups can suc-
cessfully pretend that they are better informed about citizens’ preferences than representa-
tives, policies might be implemented that are farther away from median voter outcomes. Em-
pirical results by POMMEREHNE (1978), GERBER (1999) or MATSUSAKA (2004, 2007), how-
ever, support the contention that public policies are more in line with median voter prefer-
ences in direct than in representative democracies. MATSUSAKA (2007a) provides further evi-
dence for the U.S. that indirect (threatening) effects are of minor quantitative importance.
5) 
Additional arguments speak in favor of differences in redistributive policies between direct 
(with referendums or initiatives) and representative democracies. Compared to pure represen-
                                                            
4.  For surveys on rent seeking see EKELUND and TOLLISON (2001), MCCHESNEY (2001) and MUELLER (2003). 
5.  A correction of public spending towards median voter preferences does not necessarily imply less spending 
as MATSUSAKA (2000, 2004) shows for the early 1900s in the U.S. See also SASS (1991).  
tative democratic systems with majoritarian elections, institutions of direct democracy restrict 
pork barrel politics and logrolling. This contention applies either to referendums, in which 
statutes or constitutional amendments decided in the representative part of the democratic sy-
stem can be rejected or accepted by the electorate, or popular initiatives, in which citizens for-
mulate legislation directly and are able to induce a decision at the ballots if a pre-specified 
number of signatures is collected. With respect to referendums, it could be argued that trans-
action costs of trading votes in logrolling exercises are prohibitively high (BRETON 1996). 
Moreover, as referendum outcomes are not attached to outcomes in particular constituencies, 
citizens consider the general (marginal) cost and (marginal) benefits of a spending project in-
stead of comparing the geographically concentrated (marginal) benefits with nationally dis-
persed  (marginal)  cost.  REDOANO  and  SCHARF  (2004)  and  SCHNELLENBACH,  FELD  and 
SCHALTEGGER (2006) derive similar results by showing that referendums prevent representa-
tives from centralizing government activities via logrolling.   
Compared to representative democratic systems with proportional representation (PR), it is 
important to emphasize the role of referendums as a possibility to veto policies that are too far 
from citizens’ preferences. In PR systems, representatives gain a seat in the legislature by 
entering their party’s lists in higher and more promising ranks. In order to get such a position 
on the party list, past performance of representatives, but also the congruence of that perform-
ance with party ideology play a role. Such partisan deviations from citizens’ preferences oc-
cur less frequently if policies have to pass a referendum. Similar to partisan considerations, 
partial interests of particular groups could be less easily enforced in systems of direct democ-
racy than in pure PR systems as long as the direct effects of direct democratic institutions 
over-compensate their indirect (threatening) effects (as evidence for the U.S. suggests). Popu-
lar initiatives then enable citizens to question spending projects that entail particular redis-
tributive coalitions as they could be frequently observed in shaping the social welfare pro-
grams dominant in European countries. LIEFMANN-KEIL (1974) already demonstrates how 
special interest groups are able to influence social welfare programs initially designed to re-
distribute income from the rich to the poor such that those partial interests benefit.  
In majoritarian systems, it could therefore be expected that referendums and initiatives nega-
tively affect the ability of legislatures for targeting spending to their electoral districts. As 
welfare spending can be less easily concentrated in electoral districts than (industrial or agri-
cultural)  subsidies  and  particular  infrastructural  projects,  referendums  and  initiatives  less 
probably reduce welfare spending. In PR systems, instruments of direct democracy suppos- 
edly affect those elements in general redistribution programs negatively that are included due 
to partisan considerations or the influence of special interest groups. If preferences for redis-
tribution exist in the electorate (see CORNEO and GRÜNER 2002) and large programs of social 
welfare are designed, instruments of direct democracy may well reduce overall welfare spend-
ing and induce a redistribution policy that is targeting the needy.
6) Finally, decentralization of 
spending (and revenue) will reduce the size of income redistribution programs independently 
from the electoral system. If instruments of direct democracy lead to decentralization of gov-
ernment activities, e.g. because vote trading is more difficult (SCHNELLENBACH, FELD and 
SCHALTEGGER 2006), the resulting fiscal competition negatively affects income redistribution.  
These predictions are partly supported by empirical evidence for Switzerland. In Switzerland, 
legislatures at the cantonal level are almost exclusively elected by proportional representation 
(SCHALTEGGER and FELD 2007). It is thus not surprising that SCHALTEGGER (2001) and VAT-
TER and FREITAG (2002) find that welfare spending is lower in direct than in representative 
democratic cantons.
7) While the decentralization and the differential impact of different insti-
tutions of direct democracy is carefully analyzed in the latter study, the studies on spending 
structure provide less differentiated evidence. We thus start the empirical analysis by focusing 
on different spending components before explicitly investigating income redistribution.  
3  Swiss Data on Direct Democracy and the Income Distribution  
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is however necessary to briefly introduce the 
Swiss political system. Switzerland is an ideal laboratory to study the impact of direct democ-
racy on policy outcomes. Aside from its pronounced structure of fiscal federalism, Switzer-
land is known for its institutions of direct democracy – both at the federal, state and local lev-
els. All cantons have some form of semi-direct democracy with a parliamentary system with 
legislators elected according to a system of proportional representation, but the extent of these 
popular rights varies between cantons (TRECHSEL and SERDÜLT 1999, FELD and MATSUSAKA 
2003). Only two cantons (Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Glarus) still take political decisions in 
cantonal meetings (Landsgemeinde), while in the remaining cantons people’s will is exercised 
exclusively through different institutions of political participation at the polls. In all cantons, 
proposals can be initiated via the voter initiative, and new laws passed by the legislature are, 
to different degrees, subject to an optional or a mandatory popular referendum. Moreover, 
                                                            
6.  The prediction is less clear-cut if a social welfare state does not exist.   
fiscal referendums on new spending projects of sub-national governments have been of par-
ticular interest in the literature. Finally, the rarely used constitutional initiative and referen-
dum complement the set of institutions of direct legislation.  
In our empirical analysis, we use a composite index of direct democracy as proposed by FREY 
and STUTZER (2000) which consists of many different instruments of direct democracy, but 
also study the impact of specific institutions of direct democracy. In order to contrast the in-
dex with some of its components, we have a closer look at the data for the fiscal referendum, 
the legislative initiative, the optional legislative referendum, and the index values of the year 
1992 (see Table 1). There exists no fiscal referendum at the federal level, but with the excep-
tion of the canton of Vaud (VD) all cantons have some kind of a fiscal referendum. 13 can-
tons have a mandatory as well as an optional fiscal referendum. In seven other cantons (BE, 
BS, BL, AG, TI, VS, GE) only the optional fiscal referendum exists, whereas in SZ, GL, ZG, 
AR, NE new spending projects have to pass a mandatory, but not an optional fiscal referen-
dum. Comparing the different forms of fiscal referendums and their spending thresholds with 
the index of direct democracy, there is a some correspondence, but the index contains addi-
tional information as the correlation coefficient between the index of direct democracy and a 
dummy variable for mandatory fiscal referendums is 0.30 only (see Appendix Table A3).  
When it comes to particular components of public spending, however, the institutional logic 
of Swiss direct democracy must be taken into account. The fiscal referendum is designed to 
give citizens control on new spending projects exceeding a pre-specified spending threshold. 
In the case of non-recurring spending, mainly large infrastructural projects or public buildings 
are affected. In the case of recurring spending, public employment is most probably influ-
enced. Welfare spending is however resulting from legal statutes which are most strongly 
affected by the optional legislative referendum as an instrument to veto spending projects, or 
by the legislative initiative as an instrument to induce new legislation, which potentially in-
creases or decreases welfare spending. The index of direct democracy also reflects these in-
struments as the correlation coefficient between the signature requirement for the legislative 
initiative and the direct democracy index is -0.74, and that between the signature requirement 
for the optional legislative referendum and the direct democracy index is -0.68. The latter 
indicates that a higher signature requirement coincides with less direct democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7.  Single referendum decisions do not provide clear-cut evidence as the analyses of referendums on the Swiss 
old age pension system by POMMEREHNE and SCHNEIDER (1985) or BÜTLER (2002) illustrate.  
Table 1: Direct Democracy in Swiss Cantons 





















ZH  2-20  20  0.2-2  2  10000  0  4.2 
BE  2  –  0.4  –  15000  10000  3.7 
LU  3-25  25  Specific stipulations  4000  3000  4.5 
UR  0.5  1  0.05  0.1  300  300  5.4 
SZ  –  0.25  –  0.05  2000  2000  4.9 
OW  0.5  1  0.1  0.2  1  1  5.6 
NW  0.25  5  0.05  0.5  250  250  4.9 
GL  –  0.5  –  0.1  1  1  5.5 
ZG  –  0.5  –  0.05  2000  1500  4.4 
FR  0.25 %  1 %  0.25 %  1 %  6000  6000  2.5 
SO  1-2  2  0.1-0.2  0.2  3000  1500  5.7 
BS  1  –  0.2  –  4000  2000  4.4 
BL  0.5  –  0.05  –  1500  0  5.7 
SH  0.3-1  0.3  0.05-0.1  0.05  1000  1000  5.2 
AR  –  5%  –  1%  300  300  5.5 
AI  0.25  0.5  0.05  0.1  1  1  5.3 
SG  3-15  15  0.3-1.5  1.5  4000  4000  3.6 
GR  1-5  5  0.3-0.5  0.5  3000  0  4.8 
AG  3  –  0.3  –  3000  0  4.5 
TG  1  3  0.2  0.6  4000  2000  4.2 
TI  0.2  –  0.05  –  7000  7000  2.1 
VD  –  –  –  –  12000  12000  2.4 
VS  0.75%  –  0.25%  –  4000  3000  3.4 
NE  –  1.5%  –  1.5%  6000  6000  2.2 
GE  0.125  –  0.06  –  10000  7000  1.8 
JU  0.5 %  5%  0.05%  0.5%  2000  2000  3.7 
Source: LUTZ and STROHMANN (1998); TRECHSEL and SERDÜLT (1999); FREY and STUTZER (2000). 
a)  In million Swiss Francs if not indicated otherwise. 
b)  The index is constructed as an unweighted average of the indexes of the legislative initiative, the legisla-
tive referendum, the constitutional initiative, and the fiscal referendum, referring to their existence and 
the respective signature requirement as the number of signatures relative to the number of voters, the 
days within which the signatures have to be collected and the financial threshold as the per capita spend-
ing limit allowing for referendum (the values correspond to the year 1992). 
4  The Impact of Direct Democracy on Welfare Spending and Taxation 
4.1. The Model 
In order to test the impact of direct democracy on income redistribution, we follow a two step 
strategy. First, we analyze welfare and non-welfare expenditure as a function of direct democ-
racy and controls in order to get some insights on differences between direct and representa-
tive democratic cantons with respect to that spending component most important for income 
redistribution in PR systems. This analysis is conducted for the sum of cantonal and local wel-
fare and non-welfare spending as well as for cantonal spending categories in order to capture  
the effect of fiscal decentralization. Second, we analyze income distribution as measured by 
Gini coefficients of the (approximated) pre- and post-tax personal income distribution as well 
as the difference between these two distributions that accounts for effective income redistribu-
tion. We thus propose the following basic model: 
  IDit    =   β0  +  β1 DIRDEMit  +  β2’Vit +  uit  (1) 
where IDit stands for the different dependent variables that are of interest for income redistri-
bution. More precisely, in this section we take a closer look at the real per capita welfare and 
non-welfare spending at the cantonal and local levels. All spending variables are in logs. In 
the next section, we consider Gini coefficients of the pre- and post-tax income distribution.  
The model implies that IDit is a function of direct democracy, as measured by the Frey-Stutzer 
index (DIRDEMit), and a vector of control variables Vit. The parameter of interest is β1, while 
uit denotes the error term. As a robustness test, we also estimate this model replacing the in-
dex with measures of several important institutions of direct legislation which constitute com-
ponents of the index of direct democracy and pertain to the daily policy-making, such as those 
institutions that affect the legislative process at the cantonal level. With this approach, we 
exclude the constitutional referendums and initiatives only. Through this robustness test we 
intend to disentangle the potentially contrasting effects of the single institutions that are sub-
merged in the composite index because of its ‘kitchen-sink’ nature.  
The vector of the single direct democratic institutions contains (1) a dummy for the availabil-
ity of a mandatory fiscal referendum on new spending projects, (2) the financial threshold per 
capita that triggers the mandatory fiscal referendum (set to zero for cantons without this insti-
tution) and, (3) the signature requirement (per capita) for the optional fiscal referendum in 
those cantons where no mandatory fiscal referendum exists (set to zero for those cantons in 
which the mandatory fiscal referendum exists).
8) To a certain extent, the third determinant 
constitutes a ‘mirror image’ of the first and the second. Finally, the required signatures per 
capita for (4) triggering the optional legislative referendum or (5) launching a legislative ini-
tiative belong to this vector. Given the institutional logic described in Section 3, we do not 
expect the fiscal referendum to exert a clear-cut impact on welfare expenditure, while the leg-
islative referendum and initiative can be expected to be most influential for social welfare.  
                                                            
8.  Given the construction of the threshold variables, both can be viewed as an interaction between the financial 
threshold of either fiscal referendum and its availability. The underlying idea is that the optional referendum 
has an influence particularly in those cantons in which it substitutes the non-existent mandatory referendum.   
In line with previous empirical work by SCHALTEGGER (2001) as well as VATTER and FREI-
TAG (2002), and with our theoretical considerations in Section 2, we expect a negative impact 
of direct democracy on welfare and non-welfare spending. We could also predict the optional 
legislative referendum to reduce welfare spending and the mandatory fiscal referendum to 
reduce non-welfare spending. A higher spending threshold may then be positively associated 
with those expenses.
 Analogously, the optional fiscal referendum might lower expenditures, 
most strongly in those cantons in which no mandatory fiscal referendum exists. In contrast, 
the previous findings for the initiative suggest an overall expenditure rising impact of stronger 
initiative rights (lower signature requirements), often termed ‘fiscal gas pedal’ effect.
9)  
The vector of control variables Vit  consists, first, of variables capturing the fiscal federalism 
(see Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for descriptive statistics): fiscal decentralization, measured 
by the share of local in total cantonal and local spending; tax competition, measured by the 
inverse of the average of all other cantons’ income tax rates in the highest income tax bracket, 
weighted by the inverse of geographical distance between cantonal capitals; and the log of 
unconditional grants which address the impact of vertical transfer payments from the federal 
government to cantonal governments. The more fiscally decentralized a canton and the more 
intensive tax competition are, the less leeway exists for income redistribution because of mi-
gration incentives. In addition, a variable incorporating fiscal constraints at the cantonal level 
is included. They can be seen as a supplementary instrument to limit the spending possibilities 
of policymakers and hence their ability to redistribute income (SCHALTEGGER, 2002). Direct 
democracy, tax competition and fiscal constraints impose particular restrictions on cantonal 
budgets such that cantons are induced to shift responsibilities to the local level. It is thus nec-
essary to have a look at cantonal and local as well as cantonal spending structure to under-
stand how redistribution is affected by these institutions. Finally, unconditional grants help to 
finance additional spending and relax cantonal budget constraints. 
Moreover, political determinants are captured by a coalition variable in order to empirically 
evaluate the effect of broad-based coalition governments on the exploitation of the budget as a 
fiscal commons (SCHALTEGGER and FELD 2007). Moreover, the net share of conservative par-
ties in the government is considered in order to control for the ideological disposition to redis-
tribute income. In line with the literature, we expect this variable to have a negative impact on 
(the policy instruments of) income redistribution.  
                                                            
9.  See FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001) for a ‘gas pedal’ effect in cantons where mandatory fiscal referendums 
is a counterbalancing spending dampening institution, while otherwise the initiative serves as ‘fiscal break’.  
Socio-economic factors of influence are reflected by the log of national income, disaggregated 
to the cantonal level, that captures a possible income effect on the demand for public goods 
(WAGNER 1892), but also accounts for income redistribution as an insurance against risk. The 
log of the ratio of urban population in a canton reflects the impact of agglomeration on fiscal 
policy decisions of governments. In urban areas, a concentration of poor people often occurs 
such that additional income redistribution has to be undertaken. On the other hand, the log of 
population might take into account economies of scale for achieving an identical level of sup-
ply of public goods. Finally, the logs of the shares of young and senior populations are in-
cluded in order to reveal the influence of the two groups which (supposedly) most strongly 
benefit from income redistribution measures by the state. We also employ a French and Ital-
ian language dummy to account for cultural differences between Swiss language areas. Fi-
nally, year effects are included in the regressions (not reported).  
The analysis uses annual data from 1980 to 1998 deflated to the year 1980. As the canton of 
Jura, created by a secession from the canton of Bern in 1977, is recorded in the statistics in the 
years 1979 and 1980 for the first time, the earliest date for a balanced panel of the current 26 
cantons is the year 1980. The subscript i = 1, ..., 26 denotes cantons and t = 1980, ..., 1998 
indexes years. The empirical analysis is performed using a pooled cross-section time-series 
model. As in FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001), we argue that despite the panel structure of the 
data the inclusion of cantonal fixed effects in the cross-section domain is inappropriate be-
cause the institutional variables vary only very little over time in most cantons. Accordingly, 
cantonal intercepts do not make sense as the captured impact on fiscal outcomes is either 
solely driven by the time variation or, in case of time invariant variables, fixed effects are 
likely to hide the impact of institutional variables and render them insignificant. Moreover, 
OLS estimation with panel-corrected standard errors has the advantage over a random effects 
method that it yields efficient estimates with an error variance-covariance estimator robust to 
three of the common problems associated with panel data: heteroscedasticity across panels, 
and serial correlation within and across panels. In our case, we employ autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors according to the Newey-West method. A draw-
back of the OLS method is, however, that the model specification must be as complete as pos-
sible to prevent an omitted variable bias.
10) 
                                                            
10. An application of a GMM estimator which is efficient in the presence of heteroscedastic and autocorrelated 
errors did not yield substantially different results form the ones reported here. The small sample size, how-
ever, did not permit to rely on this estimator exclusively.   
Table 2: Cantonal and Local Welfare and Non-Welfare Expenditure per Capita, in logs, 
1980 – 1998, 494 Observations 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Direct democracy index  -0.178**  -0.037*  –  – 
  [7.50]  [2.45]     
Signature requirement for op-  –  –  0.079**  -0.043** 
tional legislative referendum      [3.80]  [4.50] 
Signature requirement   –  –  -0.122**  0.080** 
for legislative initiative      [4.06]  [5.53] 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.065  -0.592**  -0.285+  -0.551** 
  [0.47]  [5.71]  [1.96]  [5.35] 
Tax competition  -0.062  -0.084*  -0.163*  -0.009 
  [1.05]  [2.13]  [2.36]  [0.22] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.055**  -0.011  -0.027*  -0.006 
  [4.76]  [1.40]  [2.31]  [0.79] 
Log of unconditional grants  -0.015  0.157**  0.021  0.155** 
  [0.30]  [4.75]  [0.38]  [4.86] 
Number of parties   0.040*  0.005  -0.019  -0.001 
in the cantonal government  [2.14]  [0.31]  [1.13]  [0.06] 
Net share of conservative   -0.184*  0.122+  -0.079  0.112+ 
parties in the government  [2.14]  [1.80]  [0.88]  [1.72] 
Log of national income  0.485**  0.224*  0.729**  0.321** 
  [3.75]  [2.38]  [5.39]  [3.99] 
Urbanization  0.019  -0.001  0.046**  -0.029** 
  [1.31]  [0.12]  [2.71]  [2.68] 
Log of population  -0.037  0.023  0.062**  0.047** 
  [1.53]  [1.40]  [3.05]  [4.00] 
Share of young population  -0.738*  -0.191  -0.488  -0.124 
  [2.52]  [0.95]  [1.61]  [0.70] 
Share of old population  0.856**  0.377**  1.148**  0.521** 
  [4.88]  [3.08]  [6.31]  [5.24] 
Dummy for French   -0.200**  -0.007  0.188**  0.070+ 
and Italian language  [2.69]  [0.14]  [3.41]  [1.66] 
Constant  2.776  5.327**  -3.542  3.189* 
  [1.07]  [2.80]  [1.37]  [2.13] 
Obs.  494  494  494  494 
Adj. R
2  0.8663  0.6922  0.8488  0.7089 
Jarque Bera test  3.86  9.294**  8.042*  13.92** 
F-test on inst. vars.      9.60**  18.29** 
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by OLS and Newey-West autocorrelation-and heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. Time dummies included but not reported. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of 
the estimated t-statistics. ‘‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘+’ indicates significance at the 1, 5, or 10 percent levels, respectively. 
The consistency of the estimates equally depends on the exogeneity of the regressands. The 
variables accounting for direct democracy, however, although potentially endogenous, are not 
instrumented.  There  is  a  dispute  among  Swiss  historians  and  constitutional  law  scholars  
whether Swiss direct democracy was created in the middle ages (WILI 1988, BLICKLE 2000) 
or after the French revolution (KÖLZ 1992, 2004, AUER 1996). ADLER (2006) takes an inter-
mediate position by arguing that direct “democracy” existed in pre-modern forms in some 
cantons since the middle ages, but became widespread after the French revolution. While it is 
possible that direct democracy and the fiscal variables are driven by a third unobserved factor, 
for example population preferences, a true analysis of the endogeneity of direct democracy 
needs to look very carefully into the history of direct democracy of each Swiss canton sepa-
rately. As a consequence, simple strategies to instrument direct democracy are not available.  
Also with respect to remaining control variables endogeneity might be present – at least in the 
long run. Candidates for such a simultaneity are not only government structure variables such 
as the degree of fiscal decentralization, or political variables like the ideology of the cantonal 
government, but also measures of population characteristics, as a canton’s spending policy 
might well affect mobility decisions and fertility behavior of its residents. Hence, there is no 
determinant in our model that can be said to be truly exogenous, and trying to account for all 
potential simultaneities through an instrumental variable technique is impractical.
11) As re-
gards fiscal decentralization, its low correlation (in absolute terms) with the dependent vari-
able, particularly for welfare spending (about 0.3), justifies assuming exogeneity. 
4.2. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 contain the estimation results for the components of (I) combined local and 
cantonal welfare and non-welfare expenditure per capita (Table 2), and (II) cantonal expendi-
ture measures solely (Table 3). In Table 2, in all equations for combined local and cantonal 
budget components reported, the coefficient of the composite index of direct democracy has 
the expected negative sign and is significant at least at the 5 percent level. Thus, in cantons 
with stronger direct democratic institutions less money is spent on welfare transfers as well as 
on non-welfare budget components. Comparing coefficient sizes across the estimated models, 
the coefficient of direct democracy achieves a value of -0.178 in the welfare expenditure re-
gression (1) that is more than four times larger than that observed in the non-welfare spending 
regression (2) and also stronger in statistical significance (0.1 versus 5 percent level of sig-
nificance). This finding suggests that direct democracy reduces the log of sub-federal welfare 
                                                            
11. In addition, as a robustness test, we have estimated the spending regressions using instruments for the fiscal 
decentralization variable, government ideology and pre-tax income distribution measures in the income (re-) 
distribution regressions. In general, selection of suitable instruments was difficult and most of them turned 
out to be weak, according to the J-statistics and the F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage  
spending much more strongly than that of non-welfare expenditure. Thus, direct democracy 
puts a stronger restraint on sub-federal welfare than on non-welfare spending. Moreover, the 
impact of direct democracy is more decisive than that of most of the other fiscal policy vari-
ables, particularly fiscal constraints and tax competition, the point estimates of which are in-
significant at  least  in  one  case.  The  budget  restraining  results  reported  by  SCHALTEGGER 
(2001) and VATTER and FREITAG (2002) are in line with the results reported here. We con-
clude that in a direct democracy the government allocates considerably less funds for redistri-
bution purposes (welfare transfers) than in pure representative democracies (with PR).  
In general, the remaining controls exhibit expected  influences.
12) More  specifically, fiscal 
decentralization is associated with significantly less non-welfare spending, but does not sig-
nificantly affect welfare spending. Tax competition leads to significantly less non-welfare 
expenditures, but does not significantly impact social transfer payments. These findings are 
important in light of the discussion whether decentralization and tax competition restrain the 
ability of the government to redistribute income. Unexpectedly, fiscal constraints restrict wel-
fare expenditure solely, but do not affect the remaining budget components. Hence, balancing 
the budget comes at the expense of welfare spending. Similarly, unconditional grants from the 
federal level significantly relax the cantonal budget constraints for non-welfare expenditure, 
but do not significantly influence welfare spending. The results for these two fiscal instru-
ments suggests that welfare recipients are those who have to financially bear the costs of bal-
anced budget policies but do not profit from its expansion, perhaps reflecting their marginal 
lobbying power or even social exclusion from the active electorate.  
Among the political variables, the number of parties is positively associated with welfare ex-
penditure. Interestingly, non-welfare expenditure does not appear to be affected. As expected, 
the net share of conservative parties in cantonal governments is associated with significantly 
less means for redistribution via welfare transfers, despite its weakly positive association with 
non-welfare spending. Among the economic variables, national income exerts a significant 
positive impact on all spending items, being in line with Wagner’s Law. Hence, the more af-
fluent a canton is the higher are welfare and non-welfare spending.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regression (HANSEN 1982, HANSEN and SINGLETON 1982, STAIGER and STOCK 1997). However, most of the 
results are qualitatively similar. Results are available on request.  
12. The results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. In particular the unemployment rate 
does not prove to be significant in any of the regressions. This might be due to the fact that the unemploy-
ment insurance scheme is allocated to the federal level. Results can be obtained upon request.    
As regards the socio-demographic determinants of fiscal policy, the degree of urbanization 
does not have any significant impact on welfare expenditure.
13) Economies of scale, indicated 
by the negative coefficient on population size, do not appear to exist for any of the spending 
measures. The share of young people is significantly associated with lower levels of welfare 
expenditure (although not observed for non-welfare spending), possibly reflecting the fact that 
they, on the one hand, have not yet entered the labor market, and, on the other hand, still rely 
on their parents’ resources. The share of senior residents has significantly positive effects on 
welfare payments, but also on public non-welfare expenditure. In French- and Italian-spea-
king cantons less welfare spending per capita is observed, while the remaining budget com-
ponents appear unaffected.  
Generally speaking, the model explains the variation in cantonal spending quite well, as the 
adjusted R
2's of 0.69 and higher indicate. The Jarque-Bera test on normality of the residuals 
rejects the null hypothesis for model (2). Results with outliers excluded based on 2 standard 
deviations of the residuals are reported in Table A4 of the Appendix.
14) The estimation out-
comes reveal qualitatively the same budget constraining impact of direct democracy for all 
budget components as already observed in Table 2, again with welfare spending being af-
fected to the largest extent by far.
15)  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, we report the estimation results of the same model replac-
ing the composite index of direct democracy with the legislative initiative and the optional 
legislative referendum. For cantonal total expenditure, the fiscal referendum and the legisla-
tive initiative had previously been found to decisively constrain spending at the cantonal level 
(FELD and MATSUSAKA, 2003). However, the institutional logic inherent in Swiss budgetary 
law requires to focus on the optional legislative referendum and the legislative initiative here. 
As described in the introduction to the model, these measures of direct democratic institutions 
account for, on the one hand, their availability in general, as well as, on the other hand, their 
institutional characteristics in particular that determine their strength with respect to realizing 
the median voter’s preferences (signature requirement). In general, a higher signature requi-
                                                            
13. This result, however, appears sensitive to the chosen functional form. For a significant welfare spending 
increasing influence of urbanization, see FELD, FISCHER and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2006).  
14. This rather systematic method of tackling the outliers  leaves us with some estimated equation with non-
normally distributed residuals. When we excluded outliers by individually choosing them, the results re-
mained qualitatively the same. This also holds for subsequent regressions excluding outliers.  
15. As robustness test, we have estimated the model with fiscal decentralization instrumented. Although the in-
struments are weak, as indicated by their F-test in the first stage regression, we observe again a qualitatively 
similar pattern with respect to the effect of direct legislation. The results are available on request from the au-
thors. For estimation outcomes of a similar model using IV, see FELD, FISCHER and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2006).   
rement indicates a lower level of direct democracy and less citizen empowerment as it is more 
difficult for the electorate to make use of them.  
Table 3: Cantonal Welfare and Non-Welfare Expenditure per Capita, in logs, 
1980 – 1998, 494 Observations 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Direct democracy index  -0.164**  -0.028+  –  – 
  [7.04]  [1.81]     
Signature requirement for op-  –  –  0.079**  -0.047** 
tional legislative referendum      [4.60]  [4.85] 
Signature requirement   –  –  -0.091**  0.080** 
for legislative initiative      [3.02]  [5.47] 
Fiscal decentralization  -1.181**  -2.066**  -1.385**  -2.016** 
  [10.03]  [19.51]  [10.67]  [19.22] 
Tax competition  -0.093+  -0.076+  -0.174*  0.000 
  [1.91]  [1.87]  [2.59]  [0.01] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.041**  -0.011  -0.017  -0.007 
  [3.41]  [1.36]  [1.53]  [0.88] 
Log of unconditional grants  0.021  0.153**  0.048  0.151** 
  [0.43]  [4.47]  [0.89]  [4.59] 
Number of parties   -0.074**  0.014  -0.129**  0.011 
in the cantonal government  [4.24]  [0.89]  [8.00]  [0.82] 
Net share of conservative   -0.235**  0.165*  -0.119  0.148* 
parties in the government  [3.48]  [2.44]  [1.58]  [2.26] 
Log of national income  0.273**  0.249*  0.513**  0.331** 
  [2.64]  [2.55]  [3.91]  [4.04] 
Urbanization  0.023+  -0.004  0.039*  -0.031** 
  [1.86]  [0.36]  [2.30]  [2.85] 
Log of population  -0.019  0.025  0.078**  0.044** 
  [0.94]  [1.46]  [4.90]  [3.53] 
Share of young population  -1.362**  -0.02  -1.122**  0.033 
  [5.80]  [0.09]  [4.22]  [0.18] 
Share of old population  0.442**  0.392**  0.718**  0.520** 
  [3.25]  [3.10]  [4.55]  [5.15] 
Dummy for French   -0.018  0.008  0.307**  0.071+ 
and Italian language  [0.30]  [0.15]  [6.47]  [1.66] 
Constant  8.140**  3.833+  2.052  2.052 
  [4.14]  [1.92]  [0.87]  [1.33] 
Obs.  494  494  494  494 
Adj. R
2  0.9200  0.8476  0.9073  0.8571 
Jarque Bera test  28.3**  7.107*  25.48**  12.34** 
F-test on inst. vars.  –  –  10.76**  19.05** 
Notes: See Table 2 
  
The results in Table 2 indicate that there are differential impacts by type of institution. On the 
one hand, a less costly available legislative initiative is associated with higher welfare spend-
ing, while lower costs to induce an optional legislative referendum rise non-welfare expendi-
tures. These findings for the two law-making institutions of direct democracy are in line with 
the ‘gas pedal’ effect of the initiative reported in FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001). On the 
other hand, a spending lowering influence is observable for the initiative on non-welfare ex-
penditures, and for the optional legislative referendum on outlays for welfare transfers. Thus, 
the two legislature-relating institutions appear to complement each other with respect to their 
direction of influence. As the F-statistics at the bottom of Table 2 indicate, both variables to-
gether significantly affect welfare or non-welfare spending without canceling each other out. 
The results for the optional legislative referendum and the legislative initiative are therefore in 
line with those obtained for the direct democracy index.  
Table A6 in the Appendix contains the estimation results also including the different variables 
measuring the fiscal referendum. In both equations, the availability of the mandatory fiscal 
referendum has an unexpected positive sign, indicating that stronger popular rights on spend-
ing matters increase both, welfare and non-welfare spending at the Swiss cantonal and local 
levels (at least at the 5 percent level of significance). However, in line with the expectations, a 
stronger mandatory referendum as indicated by a lower per capita spending threshold is asso-
ciated with lower levels of almost all investigated budget components (significant at the 1 
percent level). Similarly, in cantons in which no mandatory fiscal referendum is available, the 
optional fiscal referendum exerts a significant spending lowering impact on all budget com-
ponents under investigation. Overall, the impact of the fiscal referendum can thus not easily 
be assessed because of these countervailing effects.   
Generally speaking, the model explains the variation in cantonal spending quite well, as the 
adjusted R
2's of 0.71 and higher indicate. The Jarque-Bera test on normality of the residuals 
rejects the null hypothesis in model (4). Results obtained for samples with outliers excluded 
(Table A4 of the Appendix) based on 2 standard deviations of the residuals reveal a qualita-
tively similar pattern with respect to the institutions of direct democracy as already observed 
in Table 2. Qualitatively, the results for the single institutions remain unchanged.   
As second step in our analysis, the same model is employed to analyze cantonal budgets, ne-
glecting the financial contribution of the local level. The results in Table 3 show that direct 
democracy is associated with lower levels of cantonal welfare and non-welfare expenditure.  
As before, the coefficient of the direct democracy index is more than five times larger in the 
welfare spending regression than in the non-welfare spending regression, suggesting that in 
more direct democratic cantons a shrinking budget comes at the expense of the welfare sta-
te.
16) The Jarque-Bera test rejects the hypothesis of normally distributed residuals for regres-
sions (1) and (2), but an analysis with outliers excluded yields a qualitatively identical pattern 
with respect to our variable of interest (see Table A5). Again, the coefficient of direct democ-
racy is substantially larger for welfare than non-welfare spending. With values of 0.85 and 
above the adjusted R
2 indicates a good fit of the model to the data. Thus, it can be concluded 
that direct democratic institutions that are established at the cantonal level, restrains both 
overall (cantonal and local) as well as cantonal welfare and non-welfare spending.   
Again, we have analyzed the impact of the single institutions of direct legislation on cantonal 
budgets replacing the composite index. As the results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 sug-
gest, the optional legislative referendum, as the first instrument to influence the law-making 
process, increases cantonal non-welfare spending. The higher the signature requirement, and 
thus the less effective the legislative referendum could be, the lower is non-welfare spending 
and the higher is welfare spending. The legislative initiative, however, does not restrain wel-
fare expenditure, but affects non-welfare spending negatively. Again, the legislative initiative 
and the optional legislative referendum appear as institutional complements with respect to 
non-welfare spending at the cantonal level corroborated by the F-statistics at the bottom of 
Table 3. This finding is in line with our results when the composite index is employed. In 
other words, controlling for the differences among direct democratic institutions of a canton, 
we observe that in more direct democratic cantons less welfare transfers per capita occur. 
While the adjusted R
2 indicates that more than 67% of the variance can be explained by the 
model, the Jarque-Bera statistics suggest that the results might be driven by outliers. How-
ever, excluding outliers based on 2 of the residual’s standard deviations (Table A5), shows 
roughly qualitatively identical results. 
In Appendix Table A6, the results including fiscal referendums are reported. Because the fis-
cal referendum is the most important variable affecting fiscal centralization in the Swiss can-
tons (FELD, SCHALTEGGER and SCHNELLENBACH 2007), the measure of fiscal decentralization 
has been omitted in order to demonstrate the pure effect of fiscal referendums on cantonal 
welfare and non-welfare spending. The availability of the mandatory fiscal referendum exerts 
a  restraining  impact  on  non-welfare  spending,  but  not  on  welfare  payments  per  capita. 
                                                            
16. For the effect exerted by the remaining controlling variables the reader is advised to consult Table 3.  
Equally, we observe a budget reducing effect of the financial threshold that becomes the more 
pronounced the lower the signature requirement is. In contrast, a stronger optional fiscal ref-
erendum restrains only welfare expenditure, while showing no relation with the remaining 
budget components.
17) Again, the fiscal referendum appears to serve as a ‘fiscal break’ to wel-
fare transfers from the cantonal government in all Swiss cantons irrespective of whether it 
exists in its mandatory or its optional form. The findings for these institutions broadly cor-
roborate the results reported in FELD and MATSUSAKA (2003), using a model specification 
that breaks the composite index up into additional components. 
Comparing the findings across government tiers but within the identical budget category, di-
rect democracy as measured by the Frey-Stutzer index is observed to lower spending per cap-
ita both across budget categories as well as across government tiers likewise. Equally, the 
effect of the optional legislative referendum and the legislative initiative appear qualitatively 
quite identical across government tiers, indicating that local expenses do not counterweight 
the institutional effects on the cantonal budget. In contrast, opposing effects of the mandatory 
fiscal referendum across government tiers are identified as, on the one hand, its availability 
dampens the cantonal budget, but, on the other hand, it increases expenditures of the com-
bined cantonal and local budget. It might well be that direct democracy shifts spending from 
the cantonal government tier to the local level,
18) where an overcompensating effect occurs. 
An analogous argument might explain the heterogeneous impacts of the legislative initiative 
and the optional fiscal referendum within the same budget category across government tiers. 
More specifically, the estimation results for the statutory initiative suggest that it rises welfare 
expenditure at the local level.  
5  The Impact of Direct Democracy on the Redistribution on Income  
As contended above, lower levels of welfare spending do not necessarily imply that less in-
come redistribution is achieved in direct democracies. If direct democracy has a more effi-
ciently working government, these instruments may be more effectively targeted to the needy 
such that lower funds are necessary to achieve a specific level of income (re-) distribution. 
We therefore turn to the analysis of income distribution and redistribution as measured by 
Gini coefficients and their difference.  
                                                            
17. This result justifies the omission of this institution from the study in FELD and MATSUSAKA (2003) which 
analysed only total cantonal expenditures.  
18. This interpretation is in congruence with the observation that restraining the budget at a higher government 
tier  triggers a spending shift to lower levels (FELD, SCHALTEGGER and SCHNELLENBACH 2007).   
We use panel data on the share of taxpaying households and their incomes in different income 
classes for the period 1980 – 1997 from the Swiss Federal Tax Office that are aggregated at 
the cantonal level. FLÜCKIGER and ZARIN-NEJADAN (1994) use quite similar data for their 
analysis of the impact of macroeconomic policy on the income distribution in Switzerland. 
Since Swiss tax collection until recently has taken place on a biennial basis, the data set is a 
two years panel. Tax liability for periods t and t + 1 (taxation period) have been calculated on 
the basis of the average income of periods t – 1 and t – 2 (calculation period). After 1998, the 
Swiss cantons switched to annual tax collection, though not all at once, so that more recent 
data is not available yet. This is the reason why the final year used in the panel is 1997/98. 
Both pre-tax and post-tax distributions can only be approximated because the FTA data do not 
cover  the  true  gross  or  taxable  income,  but  are  limited  to  the  ‘adjusted  gross  income’ 
(‘Reineinkommen’)
19) and the actual tax payments. Therefore, we view the ‘adjusted gross 
income’ as proxy for gross income and calculate a hypothetical net income by deducing the 
tax payment from the ‘adjusted gross income’. More specifically, information is given on the 
number of households in the different ‘adjusted gross income’ brackets and their (aggregated) 
tax payments. While thus the impact of cantonal the tax and transfer systems on all house-
holds in one income bracket can be observed, no information on how the single household is 
affected is available, so that the calculated pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients are fairly 
rough measures of the actual cantonal income distribution. Between cantons there is consider-
able variation in whether a person is entitled to financial support and how big the size of the 
actual transfer is. Some of these social transfers directly affect the gross income and the ad-
justed gross income, some impact only the after-tax income of the needy households.
20) More 
specifically, the differences between the two Gini coefficients as a measure of the factual re-
distribution, is calculated as:  
  Ginidiff = abs(ginipost-ginipre) = ginipre - ginipost
21)  (2) 
The estimation method and the basic model to be estimated is the one already described in 
Section 4.
22) The estimation results are presented in Tables 4a and 4b, where the suffices ’a’ 
and ‘b’ indicate whether the composite index of direct democracy or the single institutions of 
                                                            
19. For a more precise definition and description of the relation between gross income (‘Reineinkommen’) and 
taxable income according to the Swiss laws of taxation, see HÖHN and WALDBURGER, 2001, p. 358. 
20. We thank E. LAUBER, tax inspector of the ESTV/FTA for clarification (personal speech, June 1, 2004). 
21. For all cantons in all years, post-tax income distribution minus pre-tax distribution has a negative sign.  
direct legislation have been employed. The first column contains the results for the pre-tax 
Gini coefficient (in percentage points), the second for income inequality after the government 
has redistributed income via taxes and transfers, while columns (3) and (4) contain the results 
for the effective income redistribution, analyzed both as unconditional and conditional on the 
pre-tax income distribution. In column (1), the direct democracy index is negatively associ-
ated with the pre-tax Gini coefficient, with significance at the 0.1% level. Consequently, in 
cantons with a higher degree of direct democracy, income distribution before the governments 
begin to redistribute income via taxes and further allowances is more equal. This observed 
impact may be possibly induced by welfare payments at the sub-federal level which already 
affect the (adjusted) gross income of Swiss households.  
Among the governance structure determinants, fiscal decentralization does not appear to af-
fect the pre-tax income distribution, while tax competition is associated with a more unequal 
distribution of income (at the 1 percent level). In contrast, fiscal constraints are significantly 
negatively related with inequality of the pre-tax income distribution. The two political deter-
minants ‘size of coalition in the cantonal government’ and ‘ideology of government’ are not 
decisive for the pre-tax income distribution. Among the economic determinants, as expected, 
higher cantonal income is associated with more pronounced inequality, while federal transfers 
prove not influential. In contrast to expectations, urbanization is not associated with a particu-
lar income distribution, while income is more equally distributed in the less populous cantons. 
A larger share of older persons is related to a more equal income distribution, which might 
reflect the highly redistributive nature of the Swiss pension system. Income distribution is 
also negatively affected by the ratio of young residents, who to a large extent have not entered 
the labor market yet, and a more equal income distribution is also observed in French- or Ital-
ian-speaking cantons.
23)  
The regression outcomes for the income distribution measured by post-tax Gini coefficients 
shows the same qualitative pattern of results (column (2) of Table 4a): With respect to our 
variable of interest, stronger popular rights appear to decrease post-tax income inequality (at 
the 0.1 percent level). For the remaining determinants we observe similar impacts on the post-
tax income distribution as already detected for the pre-tax distribution (except for fiscal de-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22. Again, results of a similar model with the composite index estimated with IV, instrumenting fiscal decentrali-
sation,  government  ideology  and  the  pre-tax  income  distribution,  is  reported  in  FELD,  FISCHER,  and 
KIRCHGÄSSNER (2006). The estimates for the institutional variable are qualitatively identical. 
23. The results are again robust to the inclusion of additional control variables, in particular the unemployment 
rate does again not prove to be significant in any of the regressions.    
centralization which appears weakly inequality increasing, being in line with the hypothesis 
that decentralization limits income redistribution through the government).  
Estimating the same model for the pre- and post-tax income distribution with the single insti-
tutions replacing the composite index reveals a pattern of influence that is in line with that 
obtained for the spending regressions (columns (1) and (2) of Table 4b). More specifically, an 
easier use of the legislative initiative is associated with higher pre- and post-tax income ine-
quality, while a stronger optional legislative referendum is negatively linked to income ine-
quality, corroborating the estimation results for the composite index. In addition to the effects 
observed in the composite index model, federal grants are now associated with higher income 
inequality, as are conservative government ideology, degree of urbanization as well as can-
tonal size in terms of population. In contrast, coalition governments as well as fiscal decen-
tralization are now associated with a more equal income distribution reflecting the correlation 
between fiscal decentralization and direct democracy.  
A look at the difference between pre- and post-tax income distributions indicates to what ex-
tent the closing of the gap in income inequality is due to the different variables in our model. 
Note that a positive (negative) sign in the difference equation in columns (3) and (4) means 
that a variable has a positive (negative) impact on the size of income redistribution, measured 
by the absolute difference between the pre- and the post-tax income inequalities. Thus, a posi-
tive (negative) sign indicates that more (less) income is redistributed and also implies that 
redistribution is more (less) equalizing because the direction of redistribution in all cantons is 
inequality decreasing. The estimation results in column (3) of Table 4a reveal that signifi-
cantly less income redistribution occurs in direct democratic cantons if measured by the com-
posite index (at the 0.1% level). The remaining variables show the same pattern of results as 
before in models (1) and (2), except for fiscal decentralization the coefficient of which is not 
significant. There is significantly less effective income redistribution in cantons with stronger 
fiscal constraints, with a higher share of senior or younger residents, in smaller cantons, and 
in the French- and Italian-speaking cantons. Wealthier cantons and cantons with a stronger tax 
competition engage more in redistribution activities. Column (3) of Table 4b reports the esti-
mation results when the index is decomposed into its single components. Qualitatively identi-
cal results with respect to the institutional variables as observed in models (1) and (2) are ob-
tained, with the legislative initiative triggering more effective redistribution and the optional 
legislative referendum lowering it.     
Table 4a: Inequality and Redistribution, 1981 – 1997, 208 Observations 
(Gini-Coefficients in Percentage Points) 






Difference  Difference 
Pre-Tax Gini-Coefficient  –  –  –  0.078** 
        [28.71] 
Direct democracy index  -2.041**  -1.888**  -0.152**  0.007 
  [9.17]  [9.19]  [7.96]  [0.72] 
Fiscal decentralization  2.812  2.696+  0.112  -0.108+ 
  [1.63]  [1.71]  [0.71]  [1.94] 
Tax competition  1.892**  1.736**  0.156**  0.009 
  [2.81]  [2.79]  [2.83]  [0.47] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.492**  -0.449**  -0.043**  -0.004 
  [4.34]  [4.30]  [4.38]  [1.07] 
Log of unconditional grants  0.789  0.783  0.003  -0.058** 
  [1.04]  [1.12]  [0.05]  [3.25] 
Number of parties   -0.272  -0.256  -0.016  0.005 
in the cantonal government  [1.16]  [1.18]  [0.80]  [0.66] 
Net share of conservative  1.068  1.049  0.022  -0.062* 
parties in the government  [0.97]  [1.04]  [0.23]  [2.15] 
Log of national income  3.946*  3.612*  0.337*  0.029 
  [2.08]  [2.06]  [2.13]  [0.55] 
Urbanization  0.069  0.067  0.003  -0.003 
  [0.37]  [0.39]  [0.17]  [0.62] 
Log of population  -1.341**  -1.247**  -0.095**  0.01 
  [4.14]  [4.19]  [3.43]  [0.97] 
Share of young population  -9.807**  -9.025**  -0.786**  -0.021 
  [3.15]  [3.15]  [3.09]  [0.23] 
Share of old population  -9.090**  -8.234**  -0.860**  -0.151* 
  [4.57]  [4.48]  [5.30]  [2.31] 
Dummy for French  -3.283**  -2.992**  -0.290**  -0.033 
and Italian language  [3.14]  [3.10]  [3.33]  [1.17] 
Constant  69.940*  65.344*  4.621+  -0.875 
  [2.13]  [2.15]  [1.76]  [0.92] 
Obs.  208  208  208  208 
Adj. R
2  0.6637  0.6633  0.6574  0.9596 
Jarque Bera test  25.22**  5388**  10.5**  19.81** 
For notes see Table 2.  
It is most interesting to finally analyze the impact of the different variables on income redis-
tribution conditioned on the pre-tax income distribution as reported in the fourth column of 
Table 4a. This method allows identification of those variables that affect income redistribu-
tion when it may be most needed to close the gap between the rich and the poor. As expected, 
a high pre-tax income inequality triggers more redistribution (significance at the 0.1 percent 
level). Again, the effect of direct democracy is very instructive: Conditioned on the pre-tax 
income distribution, cantons with direct democracy exhibit nearly the same amount of income 
redistribution as cantons with a more representative political system, as the insignificant coef- 
ficient indicates.
24) In column (4), most of the political and economic determinants prove in-
significant, as their effect might be captured by the initial pre-tax income distribution. A less 
effective income redistribution is associated weakly with fiscal decentralization, but strongly 
with transfers from the federal government, the share of conservative parties in the govern-
ment, and the share of the senior population. Overall, the model employing the composite 
index of direct democracy explains the variation in income distribution and redistribution 
quite well: At least 65% of the variance can be explained. The rejection of the null hypothesis 
of the Jarque-Bera test in models (1) through (4) might indicate the presence of potentially 
influential outliers. Estimation results when outliers are excluded (Appendix Table A7a) re-
veal no qualitative changes for the impact of Swiss direct democracy at the cantonal level.
25) 
Similar results are obtained if the composite index is replaced by measures pertaining to con-
crete institutions of direct democracy (column (4) Table 4b). As observed for the composite 
index, the previous significances break down when the measure of the initial income distribu-
tion is included, equally suggesting that in direct democratic cantons effective income redis-
tribution conditional on the given pre-tax income inequality is only weakly affected. Neither 
the optional legislative referendum nor the legislative initiative have any significant effect on 
income redistribution if the initial income distribution is controlled for. Also, exclusion of 
outliers does not alter these findings substantially (Appendix Table A7b). When the variables 
capturing the fiscal referendum are also included (Appendix Table A8), a more diverse pic-
ture emerges with the mandatory referendum leading to less equal income distributions, to 
more  income  redistribution  without  controlling  for  the  initial  income  distribution  which 
breaks down when the latter is included. Its financial threshold corroborates these findings. 
The financial threshold for the optional fiscal referendum reveals opposite signs being in line 
with the effects of the optional legislative referendum and the direct democracy index. 
Taking the results of Tables 2, 3 and 4 together, the impact of direct democracy is very in-
triguing: There are significantly less funds in terms of welfare transfers (composite index and 
single institutions) available for income redistribution, and the estimation with the composite 
index shows that there is evidently less effective equalization of income inequality. But if the 
pre-tax income inequality is taken into account, income redistribution in direct democratic 
                                                            
24. The inclusion of an interaction term between direct democracy and the initial income distribution did not 
change our estimation results. Both interaction term and political institution were (jointly) insignificant.  
25. In addition, as robustness test the models have been estimated with each institution separately included. Ac-
cording to the results, in all cases qualitatively identical impacts in terms of direction of influence and sig-
nificance levels can be observed.     
cantons is as high as in all other cantons, or, as the results for the single institutions suggest, 
might even be higher than in more representative political systems. This supports the argu-
ments that welfare payments in direct democratic cantons are better targeted than in more 
representative cantons: the available means are more effectively used in direct than in repre-
sentative democratic cantons. 
Table 4b: Inequality and Redistribution, 1981 – 1997, 208 Observations 
(Gini-Coefficients in Percentage Points) 







Difference  Difference 
Pre-Tax Gini-Coefficient  –  –  –  0.077** 
        [34.52] 
Signature requirement for op-  0.682**  0.636**  0.045**  -0.007 
tional legislative referendum  [4.27]  [4.30]  [3.57]  [1.37] 
Signature requirement   -1.416**  -1.306**  -0.110**  -0.001 
for legislative initiative  [5.35]  [5.33]  [5.25]  [0.16] 
Fiscal decentralization  0.318  0.384  -0.071  -0.095* 
  [0.20]  [0.26]  [0.52]  [2.26] 
Tax competition  0.677  0.614  0.064  0.012 
  [0.94]  [0.92]  [1.14]  [0.71] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.14  -0.124  -0.015*  -0.005 
  [1.64]  [1.57]  [2.18]  [1.53] 
Log of unconditional grants  1.262+  1.218+  0.041  -0.056** 
  [1.74]  [1.83]  [0.71]  [3.94] 
Number of parties   -0.923**  -0.858**  -0.064**  0.007 
in the cantonal government  [4.59]  [4.64]  [3.76]  [1.13] 
Net share of conservative  1.601  1.555+  0.049  -0.075** 
parties in the government  [1.59]  [1.68]  [0.60]  [3.01] 
Log of national income  6.775**  6.233**  0.544**  0.022 
  [4.02]  [4.01]  [3.94]  [0.51] 
Urbanization  0.386+  0.358+  0.029+  -0.001 
  [1.78]  [1.79]  [1.66]  [0.22] 
Log of population  -0.214  -0.203  -0.013  0.004 
  [0.91]  [0.94]  [0.64]  [0.65] 
Share of young population  -6.619*  -6.074*  -0.550*  -0.04 
  [2.19]  [2.18]  [2.26]  [0.59] 
Share of old population  -5.488**  -4.903**  -0.589**  -0.167** 
  [2.78]  [2.69]  [3.78]  [3.54] 
Dummy for French  1.528+  1.446+  0.084  -0.034+ 
and Italian language  [1.83]  [1.88]  [1.21]  [1.85] 
Constant  -5.416  -4.379  -0.989  -0.586 
  [0.18]  [0.16]  [0.42]  [0.86] 
Obs.  208  208  208  208 
Adj. R
2  0.5831  0.5818  0.5951  0.9598 
Jarque Bera test  78.41**  74.2**  105.4**  4.474 
F-test on inst. vars.  17.84**  17.86**  15.43**  1.26 
For notes see Table 2.   
6  Concluding Remarks 
Does direct democracy lead to less redistribution? Taking into account that it is associated 
with lower welfare expenditure, one might draw such a conclusion. That public welfare ex-
penditure is somewhat lower might, however, not necessarily compromise redistribution. Be-
cause public expenditure could be better tailored to the needs of the electorate in direct de-
mocracies, given the amount of public welfare expenditure its redistributive effect might be 
larger than in purely representative systems. Taking these two countervailing effects into ac-
count, it is theoretically open which of them dominates. 
Our results provide an interesting picture. Looking just at the differences between the income 
distributions before and after taxation, it is shown that direct democracy is negatively associ-
ated with redistribution. But taking into account that redistribution is needed the more unequal 
the pre-tax income distribution is, direct democracy looses its negative effect on redistribution 
completely. This indicates two things: first, efficiency gains are present in direct democracies 
when it comes to reducing income inequality; second, redistribution is the more effective the 
more the electorate assesses it as being justified by unequal starting conditions.  
The results which are presented in this paper provide, however, only for a first step. Further 
analyses must follow. One obvious shortcoming of this study is that by using tax data those 
who do not pay taxes (and might be the poorest citizens in the society) are not included in our 
analysis. Another shortcoming of these tax data is that they are rather based on household 
than personal income and do not take into account the number of persons living in the same 
household. Finally, one should consider that we only deal with the cantonal and local level. 
On the other hand, a large part of redistribution is done by the federal level.
26) Moreover, the 
perhaps strongest redistributive part of the Swiss welfare state is the first pillar of the old age 
pension system (AHV) which is assigned to the federal level. It is much more redistributive 
as, e.g., the corresponding German pension system. Nevertheless, not only its introduction but 
also all of its revisions have finally been accepted in nationwide popular referenda. Thus, 
Switzerland with its direct democracy at all governmental levels can hardly be seen as an ex-
ample where the welfare state is endangered by the existence of direct popular rights. 
 
 
                                                            
26. See for this the corresponding estimates in KIRCHGÄSSNER and POMMEREHNE (1996) and FELD (2000).  
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Cantonal Budget Sample, 494 observations 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Public revenue (cantonal)  4125.71  1559.56  2264.18  10768.41 
Log of  8.27  0.32  7.72  9.28 
Public revenue (cantonal + local)  10344.57  2363.41  6766.88  18922.76 
Log of   9.22  0.21  8.82  9.85 
Public tax revenue (cantonal)  1916.15  1094.98  148.99  6119.94 
Log of  7.45  0.44  5.00  8.72 
Public tax revenue (cantonal + local)  3237.19  1006.91  1830.00  7340.00 
Log of   8.04  0.27  7.51  8.90 
Welfare expenditure (cantonal)  504.73  343.05  170.40  2003.27 
Log of  6.05  0.56  5.14  7.60 
Welfare expenditure (cantonal + local)  694.45  368.93  218.09  2226.95 
Log of   6.42  0.48  5.38  7.71 
Non-Welfare expenditure (cantonal)  3712.09  1397.95  2062.86  9130.56 
Log of  8.16  0.32  7.63  9.12 
Non-Welfare expenditure (cantonal + local)  9886.83  2321.66  6434.98  17203.38 
Log of   9.17  0.22  8.77  9.75 
Direct democracy  4.29  1.22  1.5  5.83 
Mandatory fiscal referendum  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Financial threshold for mand. ref.  6.17  9.85  0  42.72 
Financial threshold for optional ref.  0.27  0.87  0  9.07 
Signature requ. for legislative ref.  2.69  5.95  0  44.37 
Signature requ. for statutory initiative  1.46  1.06  0.00  3.88 
Fiscal decentralization  0.33  0.11  -0.01  0.49 
Tax competition  -1.50  0.37  -2.30  -0.87 
Fiscal constraints  0.37  1.08  0  4 
Log of unconditional grants  6.07  0.33  5.41  7.18 
Number of parties  
in the cantonal government  3.25  0.86  1  5 
Net share of conservative  
parties in the government  -0.10  0.18  -0.6  0.4 
Log of national income  10.68  0.20  10.32  11.44 
Urbanization (log)  -1.79  1.46  -4.61  -0.01 
Log of population  11.93  1.11  9.45  13.99 
Share of young population (log)  3.30  0.14  2.85  3.58 
Share of old population (log)  2.95  0.12  2.62  3.30 
Dummy for French  
or Italian language  0.27  0.44  0  1 
          
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Tax Data Regression Sample, 208 observations 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Pre-tax Gini coefficient  30.18  2.53  24.12  39.49 
Post-tax Gini coefficient  29.13  2.34  23.53  37.81 
Difference in Gini coefficients  1.05  0.21  0.57  1.68 
Direct democracy  4.30  1.22  1.5  5.83 
Mandatory fiscal referendum  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Financial threshold for mand. ref.  6.10  9.66  0  39.03074 
Financial threshold for optional ref.  0.28  0.76  0  5.60587 
Signature requ. For legislative ref.  2.63  4.85  0  35.43058 
Signature requ. For statutory initiative  1.46  1.07  0.00  3.88 
Fiscal decentralization  0.33  0.11  -0.01  0.49 
Tax competition   -1.50  0.37  -2.30  -0.87 
Fiscal constraints  0.37  1.08  0  4 
Log of unconditional grants  6.05  0.32  5.45  7.13 
Number of parties  
in the cantonal government  3.26  0.86  1  5 
Net share of conservative  
parties in the government  -0.10  0.18  -0.6  0.4 
Log of national income  10.68  0.20  10.33  11.40 
Urbanization (log)  0.31  0.24  0.01  0.99 
Log of population  11.92  1.11  9.46  13.98 
Share of young population (log)  27.22  3.53  17.39  35.08 
Share of old population (log)  19.26  2.44  13.90  26.95 
Dummy for French or  
Italian language  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Note: Values of the explanatory variables are two-year averages, following the biannual structure of the Tax 
data on which the Gini coefficients are based.  
 
 























             
Frey-Stutzer index  1           
Mandatory fiscal 
referendum  0.3007  1         
Threshold manda-
tory fiscal referen-
dum  -0.2193  0.3942  1       
Threshold optional 
fiscal referendum  -0.4515  -0.7617  -0.3003  1     
Signature require-
ment optional legis-
lative referendum  -0.6811  -0.1206  0.1711  0.2329  1   
Signature require-
ment legislative 




Table A4: Cantonal and Local Welfare and Non-Welfare Expenditure per Capita, in 
logs, 1980 – 1998, Outliers Excluded 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Direct democracy index  -0.169**  -0.035*  –  – 
Signature requirement for op-  –  –  0.080**  -0.045** 
tional legislative referendum      [3.59]  [5.11] 
Signature requirement   –  –  -0.099**  0.072** 
for legislative initiative      [3.61]  [5.54] 
Fiscal decentralization  0.049  -0.507**  -0.073  -0.449** 
  [0.41]  [5.63]  [0.52]  [5.11] 
Tax competition  -0.032  -0.076*  -0.04  0.002 
  [0.59]  [2.15]  [0.68]  [0.04] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.047**  -0.01  -0.029**  -0.002 
  [4.72]  [1.32]  [2.91]  [0.27] 
Log of unconditional grants  -0.004  0.180**  0.052  0.183** 
  [0.08]  [5.96]  [1.05]  [6.33] 
Number of parties   0.043**  0.002  -0.026+  -0.001 
in the cantonal government  [2.63]  [0.18]  [1.66]  [0.08] 
Net share of conservative   -0.179*  0.102+  0.019  0.118* 
parties in the government  [2.26]  [1.68]  [0.23]  [2.04] 
Log of national income  0.490**  0.228**  0.624**  0.327** 
  [4.41]  [2.60]  [5.41]  [4.39] 
Urbanization  0.021  -0.002  0.027+  -0.024* 
  [1.63]  [0.17]  [1.81]  [2.44] 
Log of population  -0.037  0.024  0.075**  0.045** 
  [1.65]  [1.54]  [4.31]  [4.24] 
Share of young population  -0.718**  -0.245  -0.556*  -0.125 
  [2.77]  [1.27]  [2.13]  [0.74] 
Share of old population  0.914**  0.408**  1.281**  0.598** 
  [5.81]  [3.76]  [9.44]  [6.86] 
Dummy for French   -0.180**  0.006  0.184**  0.093** 
and Italian language  [2.69]  [0.13]  [3.48]  [2.65] 
Constant  2.361  5.183**  -2.865  2.740+ 
  [1.03]  [2.90]  [1.35]  [1.95] 
Obs.  473  474  475  472 
Adj. R
2  0.8876  0.766  0.8783  0.7753 
Jarque Bera test  3.259  7.008*  7.52**  11.38** 
F-test on inst. vars.  –  –  8.915**  19.21** 
For notes see Table 2 
  
Table A5: Cantonal Welfare and Non-Welfare Expenditure per Capita, 1980 – 1998, in 
logs, Outliers Excluded 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Direct democracy index  -0.174**  -0.031*  –  – 
  [8.61]  [2.15]     
Signature requirement for op-  –  –  0.088**  -0.048** 
tional legislative referendum      [5.65]  [5.24] 
Signature requirement   –  –  -0.106**  0.075** 
for legislative initiative      [5.39]  [5.53] 
Fiscal decentralization  -1.284**  -1.978**  -1.315**  -1.905** 
  [13.21]  [21.13]  [12.66]  [20.65] 
Tax competition  -0.119**  -0.080*  -0.167**  0.001 
  [2.94]  [2.21]  [3.44]  [0.04] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.031**  -0.009  -0.004  -0.005 
  [3.48]  [1.25]  [0.49]  [0.68] 
Log of unconditional grants  0.026  0.173**  0.109**  0.165** 
  [0.73]  [5.52]  [3.13]  [5.49] 
Number of parties   -0.060**  0.011  -0.135**  0.009 
in the cantonal government  [4.07]  [0.77]  [10.63]  [0.72] 
Net share of conservative   -0.255**  0.153*  -0.077  0.168** 
parties in the government  [4.50]  [2.50]  [1.19]  [2.84] 
Log of national income  0.259**  0.234*  0.359**  0.335** 
  [3.19]  [2.57]  [4.39]  [4.37] 
Urbanization  0.031**  -0.004  0.041**  -0.024* 
  [3.00]  [0.37]  [3.43]  [2.48] 
Log of population  -0.022  0.021  0.087**  0.040** 
  [1.24]  [1.32]  [6.57]  [3.53] 
Share of young population  -1.241**  -0.114  -1.255**  0.009 
  [6.57]  [0.57]  [6.29]  [0.05] 
Share of old population  0.405**  0.398**  0.692**  0.580** 
  [3.64]  [3.48]  [6.30]  [6.37] 
Dummy for French   -0.039  0.002  0.308**  0.082* 
and Italian language  [0.74]  [0.04]  [7.71]  [2.21] 
Constant  8.008**  4.205*  3.756*  1.857 
  [4.93]  [2.26]  [2.34]  [1.28] 
Obs.  464  474  459  477 
Adj. R
2  0.9499  0.8832  0.9452  0.8828 
Jarque Bera test  0.5896  6.341*  3.655  10.71** 
F-test on inst. vars.  –  –  18.62**  20.01** 
For notes see Table 2. 
 
  
Table A6: Welfare and Non-Welfare Expenditure per Capita, in logs, 
1980 – 1998, 494 Observations 
  Cantonal and Local  Cantonal 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Mandatory fiscal   0.409**  0.075*  -0.080  -0.334** 
referendum  [7.51]  [2.11]  [1.39]  [6.43] 
Financial threshold for man-  0.004**  0.003**  0.005**  0.010** 
datory fiscal referendum  [3.14]  [2.89]  [3.79]  [9.70] 
Financial threshold for  0.178**  0.031+  0.109**  -0.030 
optional fiscal referendum  [7.48]  [1.87]  [2.81]  [0.79] 
Signature requirement for op-  0.100**  -0.035**  0.025  -0.102** 
tional legislative referendum  [4.36]  [3.60]  [1.28]  [5.94] 
Signature requirement   -0.232**  0.047**  -0.011  0.185** 
for legislative initiative  [6.99]  [2.73]  [0.29]  [6.04] 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.802**  -0.656**  –  – 
  [5.42]  [5.33]     
Tax competition  -0.223**  -0.068  -0.13  -0.114 
  [3.28]  [1.53]  [1.47]  [1.48] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.052**  -0.008  0.012  0.054** 
  [4.95]  [0.95]  [1.14]  [6.92] 
Log of unconditional grants  -0.04  0.123**  0.033  0.128* 
  [0.82]  [4.13]  [0.51]  [2.35] 
Number of parties   -0.033*  -0.005  -0.110**  0.038+ 
in the cantonal government  [2.12]  [0.41]  [5.78]  [1.93] 
Net share of conservative   -0.158+  0.067  -0.164+  0.017 
parties in the government  [1.93]  [1.04]  [1.79]  [0.17] 
Log of national income  0.950**  0.378**  0.522**  0.227 
  [8.73]  [4.91]  [3.10]  [1.53] 
Urbanization  0.096**  -0.018  -0.030+  -0.133** 
  [5.82]  [1.57]  [1.67]  [6.68] 
Log of population  0.073**  0.035*  0.004  -0.102** 
  [3.40]  [2.56]  [0.15]  [4.92] 
Share of young population  -0.375  -0.189  -1.696**  -1.283** 
  [1.42]  [1.06]  [4.81]  [4.59] 
Share of old population  0.910**  0.409**  0.859**  0.476** 
  [5.09]  [4.08]  [3.97]  [2.69] 
Dummy for French   0.286**  0.068  0.297**  -0.061 
and Italian language  [5.33]  [1.47]  [4.31]  [0.73] 
Constant  -5.357*  3.390*  3.753  8.443** 
  [2.47]  [2.31]  [1.15]  [3.23] 
Obs.  494  494  494  494 
Adj. R
2  0.8996  0.7308  0.8815  0.6743 
Jarque Bera test  1.662  17.6**  24.81**  75.21** 
F-test on inst. vars.  30.74**  19.58**  7.75**  34.46** 
For notes see Table 2 
 
  
Table A7a: Inequality and Redistribution, 1981 – 1997, 
(Gini-Coefficients in Percentage Points) (Outliers Excluded) 






Difference  Difference 
Pre-Tax Gini-Coefficient        0.080** 
        [39.36] 
Direct democracy index  -2.032**  -1.880**  -0.155**  0.008 
  [11.64]  [11.64]  [10.60]  [1.15] 
Fiscal decentralization  4.327**  4.071**  0.232*  -0.128** 
  [3.78]  [3.88]  [2.21]  [3.28] 
Tax competition  1.919**  1.751**  0.170**  0.000 
  [4.01]  [3.96]  [4.28]  [0.03] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.444**  -0.405**  -0.041**  -0.003 
  [5.35]  [5.30]  [5.67]  [0.81] 
Log of unconditional grants  0.469  0.499  -0.026  -0.054** 
  [1.03]  [1.20]  [0.67]  [3.97] 
Number of parties   -0.351*  -0.324*  -0.023+  0.007 
in the cantonal government  [2.21]  [2.22]  [1.67]  [1.42] 
Net share of conservative  1.509*  1.435*  0.063  -0.060** 
parties in the government  [2.22]  [2.30]  [1.12]  [2.74] 
Log of national income  4.448**  4.048**  0.378**  0.021 
  [3.39]  [3.34]  [3.59]  [0.54] 
Urbanization  0.113  0.105  0.006  0.000 
  [0.91]  [0.91]  [0.60]  [0.12] 
Log of population  -1.509**  -1.400**  -0.105**  0.009 
  [6.52]  [6.56]  [5.34]  [1.18] 
Share of young population  -11.317**  -10.421**  -0.899**  -0.012 
  [4.88]  [4.85]  [4.89]  [0.18] 
Share of old population  -9.277**  -8.418**  -0.898**  -0.155** 
  [6.33]  [6.20]  [7.84]  [3.11] 
Dummy for French  -3.011**  -2.758**  -0.266**  -0.037+ 
and Italian language  [4.26]  [4.23]  [4.62]  [1.69] 
Constant  75.665**  70.901**  5.164**  -0.842 
  [3.00]  [3.03]  [2.69]  [1.16] 
Obs.  202  202  202  199 
Adj. R
2  0.756  0.7549  0.7548  0.968 
Jarque Bera test  154.2**  150.1**  142.6**  1.708 
For notes see Table 2.  
  
Table A7b: Inequality and Redistribution, 1981 – 1997 
(Gini-Coefficients in Percentage Points) (Outliers excluded) 
 







Difference  Difference 
Pre-Tax Gini-Coefficient        0.078** 
        [37.64] 
Signature requirement for op-  0.676**  0.631**  0.046**  -0.010+ 
tional legislative referendum  [4.32]  [4.34]  [3.78]  [1.91] 
Signature requirement   -1.686**  -1.551**  -0.138**  -0.008 
for legislative initiative  [8.33]  [8.24]  [8.43]  [1.09] 
Fiscal decentralization  1.834  1.754  0.085  -0.080* 
  [1.32]  [1.38]  [0.69]  [2.16] 
Tax competition  0.506  0.449  0.067  0.004 
  [0.76]  [0.73]  [1.27]  [0.30] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.078  -0.068  -0.01  -0.003 
  [1.03]  [0.96]  [1.52]  [0.90] 
Log of unconditional grants  1.297*  1.264*  0.017  -0.049** 
  [2.30]  [2.43]  [0.37]  [3.49] 
Number of parties   -1.015**  -0.939**  -0.082**  0.009+ 
in the cantonal government  [6.03]  [6.08]  [5.68]  [1.75] 
Net share of conservative  2.188*  2.076**  0.134+  -0.071** 
parties in the government  [2.57]  [2.64]  [1.93]  [2.98] 
Log of national income  6.865**  6.293**  0.570**  0.014 
  [5.17]  [5.15]  [5.05]  [0.37] 
Urbanization  0.520**  0.477**  0.049**  0.005 
  [2.93]  [2.91]  [3.54]  [1.14] 
Log of population  -0.372+  -0.344+  -0.032+  -0.002 
  [1.86]  [1.87]  [1.85]  [0.38] 
Share of young population  -8.545**  -7.841**  -0.742**  -0.057 
  [3.34]  [3.33]  [3.44]  [0.91] 
Share of old population  -5.894**  -5.284**  -0.635**  -0.181** 
  [3.31]  [3.21]  [4.46]  [4.18] 
Dummy for French  2.139**  1.990**  0.164**  -0.024 
and Italian language  [3.39]  [3.44]  [2.99]  [1.42] 
Constant  3.228  3.666  0.187  -0.403 
  [0.13]  [0.16]  [0.09]  [0.66] 
Obs.  201  201  203  200 
Adj. R
2  0.6872  0.6846  0.7028  0.9683 
Jarque Bera test  3.468  3.452  0.966  1.296 
F-test on inst. vars.  26.35**  35.77**  35.99**  5.38** 
For notes see Table 2.  
  
Table A8: Inequality and Redistribution, 1981 – 1997, 208 Observations 
(Gini-Coefficients in Percentage Points) 







Difference  Difference 
Pre-Tax Gini-Coefficient        0.075** 
        [31.94] 
Mandatory fiscal   2.987**  2.744**  0.244**  0.019 
referendum  [5.50]  [5.48]  [5.35]  [1.09] 
Financial threshold for man-  -0.071**  -0.064**  -0.007**  -0.002** 
datory fiscal referendum  [4.99]  [4.89]  [5.68]  [3.09] 
Financial threshold for  1.330**  1.215**  0.113**  0.013+ 
optional fiscal referendum  [4.93]  [4.88]  [5.11]  [1.79] 
Signature requirement for op-  0.603**  0.567**  0.036**  -0.010+ 
tional legislative referendum  [3.92]  [3.96]  [2.97]  [1.70] 
Signature requirement   -1.616**  -1.498**  -0.118**  0.003 
for legislative initiative  [5.43]  [5.43]  [5.13]  [0.38] 
Fiscal decentralization  -3.062+  -2.730+  -0.338*  -0.108* 
  [1.75]  [1.69]  [2.35]  [2.53] 
Tax competition  2.381**  2.148**  0.232**  0.053* 
  [3.26]  [3.16]  [4.43]  [2.58] 
Fiscal constraints  -0.440**  -0.398**  -0.042**  -0.008* 
  [4.39]  [4.30]  [5.02]  [2.56] 
Log of unconditional grants  1.828*  1.728*  0.098  -0.039** 
  [2.29]  [2.34]  [1.53]  [2.64] 
Number of parties   -0.921**  -0.858**  -0.064**  0.006 
in the cantonal government  [4.89]  [4.94]  [4.15]  [1.01] 
Net share of conservative  2.368*  2.239*  0.131+  -0.047+ 
parties in the government  [2.37]  [2.42]  [1.67]  [1.78] 
Log of national income  7.534**  6.935**  0.600**  0.033 
  [4.47]  [4.46]  [4.53]  [0.78] 
Urbanization  0.631**  0.585**  0.047**  -0.001 
  [3.34]  [3.35]  [3.09]  [0.12] 
Log of population  0.481+  0.428+  0.052*  0.016* 
  [1.81]  [1.75]  [2.31]  [2.36] 
Share of young population  -2.259  -2.131  -0.136  0.034 
  [0.77]  [0.79]  [0.60]  [0.50] 
Share of old population  -4.385*  -3.940*  -0.452**  -0.122* 
  [2.27]  [2.19]  [3.15]  [2.52] 
Dummy for French  3.035**  2.820**  0.216**  -0.012 
and Italian language  [4.18]  [4.20]  [3.71]  [0.57] 
Constant  -40.536  -36.221  -4.248+  -1.197+ 
  [1.43]  [1.38]  [1.96]  [1.88] 
Obs.  208  208  208  208 
Adj. R
2  0.6351  0.6326  0.6565  0.9618 
Jarque Bera test  142.8**  134.6**  134.6**  4.492 
F-test on inst. vars.  24.56**  23.89**  26.46**  3.22** 
For notes see Table 2.  
 